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GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW AND 
REGULATION SYMPOSIUM 
THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT:  
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONDS 
STEPHEN G. BURNS

 
The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant site in 
northeastern Japan has led to a worldwide focus on the safety of nuclear 
power and a renewed debate over its role in the generation of electricity. In 
the decade before the accident, interest in nuclear energy returned in the 
face of growing demand for electricity coupled with increased attention to 
reducing carbon emissions. These factors fostered what many call a 
“nuclear renaissance.” But, as the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi site 
unfolded in March 2011, the question seemed to become whether nuclear 
energy had any future at all. Although not as severe in terms of radioactive 
releases as the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the accident at the Fukushima 
Daiichi was significant and the only multi-unit accident in the history of 
nuclear power generation.
1
  
 
 
  Mr. Burns became the Head of Legal Affairs of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) in Paris in April 2012. He 
retired from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) as General Counsel after a career with 
the agency spanning 1978 to 2012. He also served as Deputy General Counsel, Director of the Office 
of Commission Appellate Adjudication, and Executive Assistant to NRC Chairman Kenneth M. Carr. 
Mr. Burns received the NRC’s Distinguished Service Award in 2001 and the Presidential Meritorious 
Executive Rank Award in 1998 and 2008. The views expressed in this Article are Mr. Burns’s alone 
and do not represent any position of the OECD or the Nuclear Energy Agency. 
 1.  See generally AM. SOC’Y OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON 
RESPONSE TO JAPAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EVENTS, FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY 
CONSTRUCT app. A, at 88 (June 12, 2012) (comparing economic and socio-political impacts of Three 
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National governments as well as international organizations have taken 
action to assess the safety of operating nuclear power plants and have 
embarked on plans to consider the significance of the accident for plant 
designs, the ability of plants to withstand the effects of severe natural 
phenomena, the capability to mitigate accidents if they do occur, and the 
effectiveness of emergency planning and response. For some countries, 
like Germany and Italy, the accident led to the end of tentative steps 
toward expanded nuclear generation.  
At its 55th General Conference in September 2011, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) Member States endorsed an action plan 
to address many of these issues as well as the implications of the accident 
on the legal framework for nuclear safety and regulation. Although the 
action plan addresses the range of actions one would expect in response to 
this severe accident, this article focuses on two aspects: (1) the 
responsibility of regulatory bodies and plant operators under the 
international conventions, and (2) the renewed call for a global nuclear 
liability regime. 
The approaches to enhancing the effectiveness of the international 
system in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident vary in some respects, a 
result that can be explained in part by the different context for addressing 
institutional capabilities or for establishing liability regimes under the 
relevant international instruments. On the one hand, the relevant 
international safety conventions, to which virtually every State with an 
operating nuclear power plant adheres, address in only general terms the 
principles describing the responsibility of the plant operator for safety or 
the characteristics of an effective regulator. The safety conventions rely on 
a peer review system as an incentive for improvement and adherence to 
high levels of safety. In contrast, several well-defined liability conventions 
have been developed since the earliest days of civilian nuclear power. 
Unlike the safety conventions, a major obstacle has been broader 
adherence to these instruments, particularly in their modernized forms.  
In responding to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the international 
community has acted within the existing constructs of the relevant 
instruments, for example, by calling for enhanced peer review of 
 
 
Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi accidents) [hereinafter ASME REPORT]; UN Scientific 
Comm. on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [UNSCEAR], Health Effects Due to Radiation from the 
Chernobyl Accident, 2 SOURCES AND EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION Annex D (2008), available at 
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2008/11-80076_Report_2008_Annex_D.pdf (providing assessment 
of the health effects of the Chernobyl accident). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/1
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regulatory bodies or by calling on States to join one of the liability 
regimes. Although these approaches may seem modest, they are 
pragmatic.  
Indeed, as explained in this Article, what the accident underscores is 
not a gap in principles governing nuclear safety, but rather, a need for 
greater vigilance and intentionality with respect to the accepted principles 
that already exist. Part I of this Article discusses the accident itself and the 
immediate international response. Part II describes the institutional 
structures responsible for safety, minimizing risks, and preventing 
accidents. It provides the fundamental principles to achieving regulatory 
effectiveness and plant operator accountability and the status of several 
States’ integration of such fundamental principles since the accident. Part 
III looks to liability if and when accidents occur. It provides the widely 
acknowledged principles critical to the success of any nuclear liability 
regime as well as the status of States’ acceptance of the international 
agreements necessary to effectuate a global nuclear liability regime that 
integrates these widely acknowledged principles. Part IV concludes the 
Article. 
I. THE ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR  
POWER PLANT SITE 
This part of the Article gives an overview of the accident and the 
international response to it. 
A. Description of the Accident 
The Great East Japan Earthquake struck northeastern Japan on March 
11, 2011, approximately 81 miles east of the city of Sendai and 
approximately 231 miles northeast of Tokyo, Japan.
2
 The magnitude 9.0 
 
 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REPORT: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 7–14 (July 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter NRC TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ 
ML111861807.pdf; THE NAT’L DIET OF JAPAN, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION REPORT ch. 2, 12–40 (2012) [hereinafter 
NAT’L DIET REPORT], available at http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/ 
report/index.html (English translation); INST. OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, SPECIAL REPORT ON 
THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER STATION INPO 11-005 (Nov. 
2011) [hereinafter INPO REPORT]; INST. OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER STATION, at add. (Aug. 2012), 
available at http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushi 
ma_Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf. 
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earthquake and ensuing tsunami caused widespread devastation, including 
the loss of over 15,000 lives and disruption of local infrastructure.
3
 Eleven 
operating nuclear power plants along the northeastern coast of Japan shut 
down automatically, including three plants operating at the six-unit 
Fukushima Daiichi station.
4
 The Fukushima Daiichi reactors are boiling 
water reactors designed by General Electric Company, similar to designs 
used at operating reactors in the United States and elsewhere in the world.
5
 
The first unit began operation in 1971, and the other units all began 
operation by 1979.
6
 
At the time of the accident, Units 1 through 3 were operating, Unit 4 
(located adjacent to Unit 3) had no fuel in its reactor, and Units 5 and 6, 
which are located separately from Units 1–4 on the site, were shut down 
for routine maintenance and refueling.
7
 The Fukushima Daiichi station lost 
power from the electrical grid, and flooding caused by the tsunami waves, 
including one as high as forty-nine feet, rendered all but one of the site’s 
diesel generators incapable of supplying back-up power.
8
 As a 
consequence, four of the units at the site entered a condition called “station 
blackout”—meaning the only electric power available comes from station 
batteries, which are capable of providing power only in terms of hours, not 
days.
9
 Although Units 1 through 3 had shut down automatically as 
 
 
 3. Current Situation and Government of Japan’s Response, JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/visit/incidents/announcements.html#current-situation (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013). Another 3725 persons are still considered missing. Id. No loss of life has been 
attributed to radiation releases or exposures due to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. See ASME Report, 
supra note 1, at 3, 87. 
 4. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7; Fukushima Accident 2011, WORLD NUCLEAR 
ASS’N (Nov. 2012), http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/fukushima_accident_inf129.html. For a few 
days after the earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, there was also concern about the stability of plants at 
the Fukushima Daini site, further south along the coast from the Daiichi site. Id. (discussing 
“Fukushima Daini plant”). 
 5. See NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 2, 34; NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 
8; List of Power Reactor Units, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www 
.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-power-reactor-units.html; Bill Dedman, General Electric-designed 
Reactors in Fukushima Have 23 Sisters in U.S., NBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012, 3:23 EST), http://open 
channel.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/13/6256121-general-electric-designed-reactors-in-fukushima-have-
23-sisters-in-us?lite; see also What is a Nuclear Reactor, EUR. NUCLEAR SOC., http://www.euro 
nuclear.org/1-information/energy-uses.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2012) (“PWRs [pressurized water 
reactors] and BWRs [boiling water reactors] are the most commonly operated reactors in Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.”). 
 6. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 2, 3–4. 
 7. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. 
 8. See NAT’L DIET REPORT, Exec. Summary, supra note 2, at 12; NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 9; INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 6–7; Fukushima Accident 2011, supra note 4 
(discussing “Events at Fukushima Daiichi 1–3 & 4”). 
 9. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. A station blackout is generally defined as “the 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/1
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designed in response to the earthquake itself, continued cooling of the 
reactor cores was necessary to remove residual heat and required the 
operability of equipment that relies in part on electric power.
10
  
Not only did they have to deal with the operability of critical safety 
equipment, but workers at the plant were also faced with significant 
damage to site infrastructure from the earthquake and tsunami that 
complicated their ability to access parts of the plant and conduct other 
recovery operations.
11
 Despite valiant efforts to cool the plants, adequate 
core cooling was lost within hours to the Unit 1 reactor, within thirty-six 
hours to Unit 3, and seventy-one hours to Unit 2. As a consequence, the 
fuel in each of these reactors was damaged.
12
  
Concerns also arose over the cooling capability for the spent fuel pools 
in each unit. At first, some debate occurred over whether the spent fuel 
pool in Unit 4 had been substantially drained; loss of spent fuel cooling 
capability could lead to fuel damage and radioactive releases.
13
 Explosions 
caused by the ignition of hydrogen gas released from the damaged fuel in 
the reactors impaired the functionality of equipment and the integrity of 
structures at the site, thereby further complicating site operations and 
recovery.
14
 Units 5 and 6, which are separated from the other Daiichi units 
 
 
complete loss of AC power supplies from off-site, the plant power generator and the EPSs [emergency 
power systems].” Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Safety Standards Series: Design of Emergency 
Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, at 3 n.1, IAEA Doc. NS-G-1.8 (2004). Regarding the 
regulatory requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 50.63 (2012), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
provides a definition for conducting evaluations of station blackout defenses: “Station blackout means 
the complete loss of alternating current (ac) electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear 
buses in a nuclear power plant (i.e., loss of offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip 
and unavailability of the onsite emergency ac power system). . . .” NRC Definitions, 10 C.F.R. § 50.2 
(2012) (emphasis in the original). 
 10. NAT’L DIET REPORT, Exec. Summary, supra note 2, at 14; INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 9–
10; Fukushima Accident 2011, supra note 4 (discussing “Events at Fukushima Daiichi 1–3 & 4”). 
 11. NAT’L DIET REPORT, Exec. Summary, supra note 2, at 13–14; INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 
13. 
 12. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9–11; INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 14–33 
(describing details of accident sequence in Units 1-3). 
 13. INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. 
 14. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10–12; INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, 20, 
27, 32. For example, the cause of an explosion in the spent fuel building for Unit 4 was not readily 
explained and led some to believe the fuel in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool was overheating; subsequent 
analyses attributes the cause of the explosion to backflow of gases from Unit 3 during its venting. 
INPO REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. At the time its report on the accident was issued in July 2011, the 
NRC Task force said, “The source of the explosive gases causing the Unit 4 explosion remains 
unclear.” NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and built on higher ground, were brought to a safe condition, in part 
relying on the single diesel generator that remained operable at Unit 6.
15
  
In summary, as the IAEA has characterized the events, 
[t]he Fukushima accident was the result of a combination of two 
extreme external hazards that occurred sequentially. The first and 
the initiating event was an earthquake and the second and ensuing 
event was a tsunami. During the assessment of the impact of 
external hazards on the design of a NPP [nuclear power plant], 
seismic and flooding are normally considered separately. It was also 
learned that the basic resources that are relied upon to maintain the 
three fundamental safety functions of reactivity control, heat 
removal and containment integrity were lost due to the 
unavailability of electrical power and the ultimate heat sink, 
resulting in an unmitigated accident progression. This resulted in 
the loss of control over the installation and eventually in severe 
damage to the nuclear power plant and the release of radioactive 
material to the environment.
16
 
The Japanese government initially ordered evacuation of residents within 
three kilometers of the site and expanded that to as far as thirty 
kilometers.
17
 In April 2011, the government established a restricted area 
within twenty kilometers of the site to allow temporary access for 
members of the public but excluded the public within three kilometers. 
 
 
 15.  NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9, 14; Fukushima Accident 2011, supra note 4 
(discussing “Fukushima Daiichi 5 & 6”).  
 16. IAEA, Progress in the Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety: Report by 
the Director General, ¶ 7, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2012/11-GC(56)/INF/5 (Aug. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-5-att1_en.pdf. 
Although study of the radioactive releases from the accident and their impact are ongoing, the releases 
and estimated health effects are considered to be far lower than that of the Chernobyl accident. See 
James Acton & Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, THE CARNEGIE PAPER, at 6 (Mar. 
2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable; John E. Ten 
Hoevea & Mark Z. Jacobson, Worldwide Health Effects of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 5 
ENERGY & ENV’T. SCI. 8743, 8753, 8754 (2012), available at http://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/article 
landing/2012/ee/c2ee22019a.  
 17. See IAEA, REPORT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO IAEA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON 
NUCLEAR SAFETY—ACCIDENT AT TEPCO’S FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS, RESPONSE TO 
THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY, at V-6–V-11 (June 7, 2011) [hereinafter JAPANESE REPORT], 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report/; NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 14. The U.S. Government recommended that U.S. citizens evacuate the area within 50 miles 
of Fukushima. Press Release, NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on U.S. 
Guidelines, NRC Release No. 11-050 (Mar. 16, 2011), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ 
ML110800133.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/1
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These restrictions remained largely in place at the end of 2012.
18
 The 
Japanese government announced in mid-December 2011 that the three 
damaged reactors had been brought to cold shutdown, a significant step in 
maintaining the long-term stability of the reactor cores.
19
 
B. The International Response to the Accident 
As efforts to stabilize the damaged plants took hold in the first weeks 
after the accident, national authorities and international organizations 
began to consider the long-term implications of the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident for the safety of nuclear power operations. The accident 
precipitated a crisis of confidence in the safety of nuclear energy and the 
institutions responsible for safe operation and oversight of nuclear 
facilities. As the accident unfolded, questions mounted in Japan about the 
robustness of plant design, the capability to withstand severe natural 
phenomena, the preparedness to cope with accidents, and the institutional 
commitment to safety and the competence of the operator and the 
regulator.
20
 The Japanese experience prompted an assessment of national 
programs as well as the effectiveness of the international regime for 
nuclear safety.  
The Contracting States to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (“CNS”) 
met in Vienna, Austria in early April 2011 for a previously scheduled 
Review Meeting under the CNS.
21
 At the meeting, nuclear regulators from 
various nations discussed their plans to study the Fukushima accident and 
consider changes to their domestic programs. Members of the CNS agreed 
to hold an “extraordinary meeting” in August 2012 to share additional 
information about their attempt to identify and incorporate lessons learned 
from the Fukushima accident into their nuclear safety programs.
22
 
Across the globe, States with nuclear power programs took steps to 
assess the safety and robustness of their nuclear power stations. In the 
 
 
 18. Fukushima Accident 2011, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Nov. 2012), http://www.world-nuclear 
.org/info/fukushima_accident_inf129.html. 
 19. Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Prime Minister of Japan and His 
Cabinet (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201112/16 
kaiken_e.html.  
 20. See JAPANESE REPORT, supra note 17, at V, XII–IV. 
 21. The convention and its significance to the international nuclear safety regime are discussed 
infra Part II. 
 22. IAEA, Summary Report of the 5th Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety, at 4–14, IAEA Doc. CNS/RM/2011/6/Final (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cns-summaryreport0411.pdf. 
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United States, home to 104 operating reactors, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”) established a Near-Term Task Force in April 2011 
to conduct a review of NRC’s processes and regulations to determine 
whether any other actions should be taken by the NRC or whether 
improvements to the NRC’s inspection regime or licensing review system 
should be made.
23
 The Task Force was directed initially to determine 
within ninety days whether any near-term or immediate actions might be 
required at U.S. power plants, particularly with respect to protection from 
natural hazards, station blackout and degraded power supplies, 
combustible gas control, mitigation of severe accidents, and emergency 
preparedness.  
The Near-Term Task Force issued its report on July 12, 2011 with 
twelve primary recommendations for NRC action.
24
 On the whole, the 
Task Force found no imminent threat requiring immediate shut-down of 
operating reactors or a halt to new plant licensing, but the Task Force did 
recommend a series of actions for the near term, while reassessment and 
improvements are made to regulation of plant safety in the longer term.
25
 
The NRC adopted, in most respects, the recommended near term actions 
while longer-term actions were further developed and also included some 
additional safety improvements for consideration.
26
 The NRC issued 
orders and required additional reports from its licensees in March 2012 as 
 
 
 23. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, app. B; Memorandum from Chairman G.B. Jaczko 
to R.W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, Tasking Memorandum—COMGBJ-11-002—
NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan (Mar. 23, 2011), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/commission/comm-secy/2011/2011-0002comgbj-srm.pdf. 
 24. NRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 69, 73–76. 
 25.  Id. at 18, 69–72. 
 26. See generally Memorandum from A.L. Bates, Acting Secretary, to R.W. Borchardt, 
Executive Director for Operations, Staff Requirements–SECY-11-0093–Near-Term Report and 
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan (Aug. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2011/2011-0093srm.pdf; Memorandum 
from A.L. Vietti Cook, Secretary, to R.W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, Staff 
Requirements–SECY-11-0124–Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near-
Term Task Force Report (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/srm/2011/2011-0124srm.pdf; Memorandum from A.L. Vietti Cook, Secretary, 
to R.W. Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, Staff Requirements—SECY-11-0137—
Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned (Dec. 
15, 2011), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2011/2011-
0137srm.pdf; Policy Issue Notation Vote, Staff Requirements—SECY-12-0025—Proposed Orders and 
Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great 
Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1203/ 
ML12039A111.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/1
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it continued down the path toward implementation of the recommended 
safety improvements.
27
 
The European Commission asked its Member States to develop a 
framework for examining the Fukushima accident and determining how 
best to address its implications within the European Union (“EU”).28 The 
EU focused on developing “stress tests” in order to perform a targeted 
reassessment of the safety margins of nuclear power plants in the light of 
the Fukushima events.
29
 The scope of the stress tests included an 
assessment of plant design bases
30
 and the engineering margins to 
withstand earthquakes and flooding, to cope with a loss of electrical power 
(station blackout), to cope with a loss of the ultimate heat sink, to protect 
against the loss of cooling for both the reactor core and for spent fuel 
pools, to maintain containment integrity, and to provide severe accident 
management.
31
 The stress test effort was undertaken by the European 
 
 
 27. The NRC issued orders to licensees in March 2012 to enhance protection of equipment used 
to mitigate fires and explosions against the effects of external events, to install spent fuel pool 
instrumentation, and to require reliable hardened vents in older General Electric boiling water reactors. 
See In the Matter of All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or 
Deferred Status: Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation 
(Effective Immediately), NRC-2012-0067, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,082 (Mar. 19, 2012); Order Modifying 
Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External 
Events Wolf Creek Generating Station, NRC-2012-0068, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,091-16,098 (Mar. 19, 2012). 
The NRC also required licensees to submit an evaluation of seismic, flooding, and other natural 
hazards on plant equipment and structures. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees and 
Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, Request for Information Pursuant to 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of 
the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (Mar. 12, 2012), 
available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12053A340.pdf. As the task force also 
recommended, the NRC has initiated rulemaking to enhance the capability to deal with a prolonged 
station blackout. Station Blackout, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,175 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
 28. Council Conclusions, 24/25 March 2011 Conclusions, EUCO Doc. 10/1/11 REV 1, CO EUR 
6 CONCL 3, at 10–12 (Apr. 20, 2011) (EC), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf. 
 29. See EUR. NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATOR GROUP [ENSREG], POST-FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT: 
PEER REVIEW REPORT, STRESS TESTS PERFORMED ON EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Apr. 26, 
2012), available at http://www.ensreg.eu/node/407. 
 30. The design basis for a plant generally refers to the range of conditions and events taken into 
account in the design, which includes conditions under normal operation as well as circumstances 
resulting from malfunctions or accidents caused, for example, by equipment failure or the effects of 
natural hazards and specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters for the 
design. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Definitions, 10 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0002.html (defining design bases). 
See generally IAEA, Safety Standards, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, at 17–27, IAEA Doc. 
SSR-2.1 (2012), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1534_web.pdf 
(discussing considerations relevant to developing a plant’s design basis). 
 31. See Eur. Commission, Joint Declaration/Press Statement on Comprehensive Risk and Safety 
Assessments of Nuclear Plants (June 23, 2011), available at http://news-europa.eu/portal/index.php/ 
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Nuclear Regulators Group (“ENSREG”), an organization comprised of 
representatives of each national regulator within the EU, European 
Commission representatives, and observers from IAEA and a few other 
countries. ENSREG issued an interim report in November 2011 that 
included reports from fifteen EU Member States as well as the Ukraine 
and Switzerland. A final report containing peer reviews was issued in 
April 2012.
32
 The stress test initiative covered 152 operating power 
reactors: 132 in the EU, 5 in Switzerland, and 15 in the Ukraine.
33
  
As an outcome of the review, national regulators within the EU were to 
develop action plans and several European-level recommendations were 
identified.
34
 In a communication to the European Council and Parliament, 
the European Commission noted that it expected to provide the Council 
and Parliament an “ambitious revision” to the EU nuclear safety directive 
in 2013 to achieve greater harmony and consistency in guidance to EU 
Member States on nuclear safety matters.
35
 Like the United States, 
European regulators did not conclude that the results of the reviews 
required suspension of operation of any particular facility, though safety 
improvements, implementation of best practices, and other measures were 
warranted.
36
  
The accident also prompted States to reassess how nuclear power fits 
into their energy portfolio. Germany, most notably, announced barely 
 
 
energy-natural-resources/item/4917-energy-stress-tests-european-commission.  
 32. See ENSREG, supra note 29; see also Commission Staff Working Document: Technical 
Summary on the Implementation of Comprehensive Risk and Safety Assessments of Nuclear Power 
Plants in the European Union, SWD (2012) 287 final (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://ec.europa 
.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/doc/swd_2012_0287_en.pdf. 
 33. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Comprehensive Risk and Safety Assessments (“Stress Tests”) of Nuclear Power Plants in the 
European Union and Related Activities, at 4 n.5, COM (2012) 571 final (Oct 4, 2012) [hereinafter 
EUR. COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION], available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/doc/ 
com_2012_0571_en.pdf. 
 34. See ENSREG, COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 1 (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/Compilation%20of%20Recommendationsl.pdf. For an 
example of the actions at a national level in Europe, see the national report of the French nuclear 
regulatory authority (Autorité de sûreté nucléaire—ASN). ASN, NATIONAL REPORT FOR THE SECOND 
EXTRAORDINARY MEETING FOR THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY 8–13 (Aug. 2012), available 
at http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/index.php/English-version/News-releases/2012/Convention-on-
Nuclear-Safety-french-report-is-published-on-ASN-website. National action plans submitted by 
participating countries at the end of 2012 or in early 2013 are available through ENSREG’s web site. 
EU Member States, ENSREG, http://www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/Country-Specific-Reports/EU-
Member-States (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 35. EUR. COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION, supra note 33, at 16. 
 36. Id. at 6–11. As the European Commission noted, implementation of particular safety 
improvements is essentially a matter of national regulation. Id. at 6, 9. 
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three months after the accident that it would abandon nuclear energy, 
effectively terminating the operations of some of its plants immediately 
and ending the operational life of others by 2022.
37
 A referendum in Italy 
overwhelmingly rejected plans to revive nuclear options.
38
 Nonetheless, 
some States, including Poland, Turkey, Vietnam, and the United Arab 
Emirates (which recently issued construction licenses for two plants),
39
 are 
proceeding with prior plans to develop nuclear power.
40
 Additionally, the 
United Kingdom continues to pursue a program of new nuclear plant 
construction.
41
 Likewise, China has resumed an ambitious construction 
program for new nuclear units.
42
 
In Japan itself, there has been an understandable ambivalence toward a 
return to operation of its nuclear power fleet. In January 2012, the IAEA 
approved Japan’s approach to conducting evaluations of its power plants, 
which the Japanese developed with the European “stress tests” as a 
reference point.
43
 At one point, in May 2012, none of Japan’s fifty still 
 
 
 37. Judy Dempsey & Jack Ewing, In Reversal, Germany Announces Plan to Close All Nuclear 
Plants by 2022, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/ 
world/europe/31germany.html; Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes [Act of 31 July 
2011], Aug. 5, 2011, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] at 1704, no. 43 (Ger.). 
 38. See Italy Nuclear: Berlusconi Accepts Referendum Blow, BBC NEWS EUR. (June 14, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13741105. 
 39. UAE Nuclear Regulator Approves Barakah Power Plant Construction, FEDERAL AUTH. FOR 
NUCLEAR REG. (July 18, 2012), http://www.fanr.gov.ae/En/MediaCentre/News/Pages/UAE-nuclear-
regulator-approves-Barakah-power-plant-construction.aspx.  
 40. See Heather Timmons & Vikas Bajaj, Emerging Economies Move Ahead with Nuclear Plans, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/business/energy-environment/15 
power.html?pagewanted=all. 
 41. See generally DEP’T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, National Policy Statement for 
Nuclear Power Generation: En-6 Nuclear Power Generation NPS, vols. 1 & 2 (July 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/meeting_energy/consents_planning/nps_en_infra/ 
nps_en_infra.aspx. An energy bill was introduced into the House of Commons on November 29, 2012 
that supports the government’s new build policy and includes provisions for establishing the Office of 
Nuclear regulation as an independent statutory entity. Energy Bill, 2012, H.C. Bill [100] pt. 2, ch. 1–4 
(U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0100/cbill_2012-
20130100_en_1.htm.  
 42. See, e.g., Three Chinese Reactor Projects Underway, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Dec. 13, 
2012), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Three_Chinese_reactor_projects_underway-1312124 
.html; Nuclear Power in China, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.world-nuclear 
.org/info/inf63.html. 
 43. IAEA, IAEA MISSION TO REVIEW NISA’S APPROACH TO THE “COMPREHENSIVE 
ASSESSMENTS FOR THE SAFETY OF EXISTING POWER REACTOR FACILITIES” CONDUCTED IN JAPAN 2 
(Jan. 23–31, 2012), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/nisa-mission 
-report0312.pdf; Statement of Japanese Cabinet, Confirmation of the Safety of Nuclear Power Stations 
in Japan, at 2 (July 11, 2011), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/pdf/stresstest_ 
e.pdf 
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operational power reactors
44
 generated electricity because further decisions 
were pending on resumed operation after stress tests and government 
consultations.
45
 In July 2012, the Ohi Unit 1 Plant was the first to resume 
operation.
46
 The Japanese government had taken some steps toward what 
appeared to be a nuclear phase-out in the 2030s, but the commitment to 
such policy appears to be waning, particularly in light of the outcome of 
national elections in December 2012 that returned the Liberal Democratic 
Party to power.
47
 
II. AN ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY 
Within a couple months after the accident, multilateral ministerial 
meetings were held to consider the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident for the safety of nuclear energy. In early June 2011, the G8 and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(“OECD”) Nuclear Energy Agency (“NEA”) held an International 
Ministerial Seminar on Nuclear Safety in Paris followed by a meeting of 
nuclear regulators, including those from the G8 and NEA member 
countries.
48
 These meetings were followed shortly thereafter by a 
 
 
 44. The IAEA maintains statistical information on worldwide power reactor status at its Power 
Reactor Information System website. The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, IAEA (Jan. 1, 2013) 
[hereinafter IAEA, The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors], http://www.iaea.org/pris/. 
 45. C. Harlan, Japan’s Last Reactor to Shut Down, Leaving Country Nuclear-free for First Time 
Since 1966, WASH. POST (May 4, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japans-
last-reactor-to-shut-down-leaving-country-nuclear-free-for-first-time-since-966/2012/05/04/gIQAcNK 
x0T_story.html.  
 46. Ohi Restart Gives Japan Breathing Space, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Ohi_restart_gives_Japan_breathing_space-0907128.html.  
 47. THE ENERGY AND ENV’T COUNCIL OF THE GOV’T OF JAPAN, INNOVATIVE STRATEGY FOR 
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.npu.go.jp/en/policy/policy06/pdf/ 
20121004/121004_en2.pdf. A Cabinet decision made days later committed only that the government 
will “implement future policies on energy and the environment, taking into account [the strategy 
document], while having discussions in a responsible manner with related local governments, the 
international community and others, and obtaining understanding of the Japanese public, by constantly 
reviewing and re-examining policies with flexibility.” Japanese Cabinet Decision, Future Policies for 
Energy and the Environment (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://www.npu.go.jp/en/policy/policy06/ 
pdf/20121004/121004_en1.pdf; see also Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan, Under Pressure, Backs Off Goal to 
Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2040, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at A9, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/japan-backs-off-of-goal-to-phase-out-nuclear-power-by-2040.html. 
The Liberal Democratic Party, which prevailed in the December 2012 parliamentary elections, is 
viewed more likely to follow a “pro-nuclear” policy and to allow a return of idled reactors to service. 
Martin Fackler, Japan Election Returns Power to Old Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/world/asia/conservative-liberal-democratic-party-
nearing-a-return-to-power-in-japan.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20121217&_r=0. 
 48. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency produced a report on the forum. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
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ministerial conference on nuclear safety at the IAEA in Vienna.
49
 The 
IAEA had sent a multinational team of technical experts to Japan for a 
“fact-finding mission” into the accident in May 2011.50 The team issued a 
report prior to the IAEA’s June ministerial meeting.51 
 This Part discusses the institutional arrangements deemed important 
for nuclear safety. It first discusses the general framework of international 
agreements on effective regulators and plant operator accountability, 
including the fundamental aspects of nuclear safety deemed important for 
evaluation after the Fukushima Daiichi accident.  Next, it discusses the 
present status of States addressing regulatory reform. Finally, this Part 
explains how safety cannot occur without holding plant operators 
accountable. 
A. General Framework of International Agreements on Effective 
Regulators and Plant Operator Accountability 
As a result of its June ministerial conference on nuclear safety, the 
IAEA developed a draft “Action Plan” of items for Member States, 
operators, the IAEA, and other multinational organizations to carry out to 
strengthen nuclear safety.
52
 After an opportunity for comment by IAEA 
Member States, the Director General submitted the plan to the IAEA 
Board of Governors for approval.
53
 The Board approved the Action Plan 
 
 
AGENCY [NEA], Proceedings of the Forum on the Fukushima Accident: Insights and Approaches, 
NEA Doc. NEA/CNRA/R(2012)12 (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/ 
2011/cnra-r2011-12.pdf.  
 49. See IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety 20-24 June 2011, Austria Centre, 
Vienna, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/conferences/ministerial-safety/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) 
(providing conference highlights).  
 50. See IAEA, MISSION REPORT: THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE EXPERT MISSION, 
IAEA INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING EXPERT MISSION OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NPP ACCIDENT 
FOLLOWING THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI 12 (2011), available at http:// www 
-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission 
_Report.pdf. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See IAEA, Declaration by the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna on 
20 June 2011, at 3, ¶ 23, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/821 (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.iaea.org/ 
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2011/infcirc821.pdf; Director General Yukiya Amano, Concluding 
Statement at the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, at 3 (June 24, 2011), http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/iaea-concluding-statement.pdf.  
 53. IAEA, Draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, Report by the Director General, IAEA 
Doc. GOV/2011/59-GC(55)/14 (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC55/ 
Documents/gc55-14.pdf. The Draft IAEA Action Plan was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors 
on September 13, 2011 and presented at the General Conference on September 22, 2011. IAEA, IAEA 
ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY 1 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter IAEA ACTION PLAN], available at 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
752 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:739 
 
 
 
 
and recommended that the IAEA General Conference endorse it during its 
September 2011 meeting.
54
 All 151 Member States endorsed the plan at 
the General Conference.
55
  
The IAEA Action Plan encourages the cooperation and involvement of 
Member States in implementing twelve main actions: 
 safety assessments of nuclear power plants in light of lessons 
learned from the Fukushima accident; 
 strengthening peer reviews conducted by the IAEA; 
 strengthening emergency preparedness and response capabilities; 
 strengthening the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies; 
 strengthening the effectiveness of operating organizations with 
respect to nuclear safety; 
 reviewing and strengthening IAEA Safety Standards and 
improving their implementation; 
 improving the effectiveness of the international legal framework; 
 facilitating the development of the infrastructure necessary for 
Member States embarking on a nuclear power program; 
 strengthening and maintaining capacity building (i.e., ensuring 
available of human resources necessary for safe nuclear power 
operation); 
 
 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/reports/actionplanns130911.pdf. The IAEA Action 
Plan was unanimously endorsed at the General Conference. IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, 
IAEA.ORG, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/actionplan/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013). 
 54. IAEA, Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport 
and Waste Safety, Gen. Conf. Res. 9, IAEA Doc. GC(55)/RES/9 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.iaea.org/ 
About/Policy/GC/GC55/GC55Resolutions/English/gc55res-9_en.pdf. Press reports indicate differing 
views among countries over the primarily voluntary nature of the Action Plan. See Fredrik Dahl, IAEA 
States Adopt Nuclear Safety Action Plan, REUTERS (Mark Heinrich ed., Sept. 13, 2011), http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2011/09/13/nuclear-safety-iaea-idUSL5E7KD1IY20110913. 
 55. IAEA, Initial Progress in Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, Report 
by the Director General, § A.2, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2011/15 (Nov. 10, 2011), available at http:// 
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/govinf2011-15.pdf. The UN General Assembly 
convened a special meeting in New York devoted to nuclear safety in September 2011, during the 
same week as the IAEA’s annual General Conference in Vienna. See Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, 
Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Opening Session of the High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety 
and Security (Sept. 22, 2011), available at https://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5553.  
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 protecting people and the environment from ionizing radiation 
following an emergency; 
 enhancing the transparency and effectiveness of communications 
and improving the dissemination of information; and 
 effectively utilizing research and development.56 
The IAEA Director General reported on progress of the Action Plan after 
the first year of its implementation before the 56th General Conference in 
September 2012.
57
 The Japanese government and the IAEA co-sponsored 
a ministerial conference in December 2012 to consider further insights 
gleaned from the analysis of the accident as well as to discuss progress on 
the IAEA Action Plan and national efforts to improve nuclear safety.
58
 
The IAEA Action Plan lists broad areas of inquiry for improvement in 
nuclear safety across a range of technical, engineering, organizational, 
institutional, and legal issues. The Action Plan is not a binding agreement 
but a statement of political commitment to focus on improving nuclear 
safety.  
The Action Plan should be understood in the context of the general 
framework for nuclear safety at the international level. Indeed, in 
specifying the focus of actions to improve the effectiveness of the 
international legal framework as one of its objectives, the Action Plan 
identifies the major conventions relevant to the tasks: 
States parties to explore mechanisms to enhance the effective 
implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety [CNS], the 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the 
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency, and to consider proposals made to amend the 
 
 
 56. IAEA ACTION PLAN, supra note 53, at 2–6. 
 57. IAEA, Progress in the Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, Report by 
the Director General, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2012/11-GC(56)/INF/5 (Aug. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-5_en.pdf; IAEA, 
Progress in the Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety Supplement, IAEA Doc. 
GOV/INF/2012/11-GC(56)/INF/5 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/ 
GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-5-att1_en.pdf. 
 58. The Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, IAEA (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/20120216/-The-Fukushima-Ministerial-Conference-on-Nuclear 
-Safety.  
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Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on the Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident.
59
 
The listed instruments are all products of the post-Chernobyl era.  
Some of these conventions were adopted with what might be 
considered remarkable speed for international instruments. For example, 
the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency
 
were adopted five months after the Chernobyl 
accident, and both were in force by early 1987.
60
 The CNS was adopted in 
1994 and came into force in 1996.
61
 It addresses the broad safety standards 
and institutional arrangements expected for operation of nuclear power 
plants.
62
 The Joint Convention focuses on matters deferred in the CNS
63
 
with respect to the obligations associated with the storage, handling, and 
disposal of spent reactor fuel and radioactive waste.
64
 
The CNS and its sister, the Joint Convention, are considered 
“incentive” conventions.65 That is, States are not subject to a particular 
 
 
 59. IAEA ACTION PLAN, supra note 53, at 4. 
 60. The two conventions were adopted in September 1986. IAEA, Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/335 (Nov. 18, 1986), 1439 U.N.T.S. 276 
(entered into force Oct. 27, 1986), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/ 
Others/infcirc335.shtml; IAEA, Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 
Radiological Emergency, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/336/Add.1 (Nov. 18, 1986), 1457 U.N.T.S. 134 
(entered into force Mar. 10, 1987), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ 
Infcircs/Others/infcirc336.shtml.  
 61. IAEA, Convention on Nuclear Safety [CNS], IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/449, opened for 
signature Sept. 20, 1994, 1963 U.N.T.S. 317 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1996) [hereinafter IAEA, 
CNS]; see O. Jankowitsch, The Convention on Nuclear Safety, 54 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 9 (1994) 
(discusses development and drafting of the CNS). 
 62. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 2. Under Article 2, the Convention applies to “nuclear 
installations,” defined as “any land-based civil nuclear power plant . . . including such storage, 
handling and treatment facilities for radioactive materials as are on the same site and are directly 
related to the operation of the nuclear power plant.” Id. art. 2(i). 
 63. See id. pmbl. (ix). 
 64. IAEA, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/546, opened for signature Sept. 29, 1997, 
2153 U.N.T.S. 357 (entered into force June 18, 2001) [hereinafter IAEA, Joint Convention]. The scope 
of the convention is described in Article 3 and may include military or defense wastes when 
transferred to civilian control. Id. 
 65. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, pmbl. (vii); IAEA, Joint Convention supra note 64, pmbl. (ix). 
See T. de Wright, The “Incentive” Concept as Developed in the Nuclear Safety Conventions and Its 
Possible Extension to Other Sectors, 80 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 29, 32–35 (2007); J. Rautenbach, W. 
Tonhauser & A. Wetherall, Overview of the International Legal Framework Governing the Safe and 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy—Some Practical Steps, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE 
POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD 7, 14–16 (OECD 2006), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/ 
chernobyl/.  
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regime of inspections or sanctions for their failure to comply with their 
obligations. Rather, each Member State agrees to periodically prepare a 
national report that includes a self-assessment of its implementation of the 
CNS and to participate in periodic peer review meetings with other 
states.
66
  
The CNS lacks detailed safety standards, but it does identify broad 
criteria related to the safety of nuclear installations as well as expectations 
with respect to radiological protection, emergency preparedness, quality 
assurance, verification of safety, and consideration of human factors.
67
 
Overall, States “shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all 
organizations engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations 
shall establish policies that give due priority to nuclear safety.”68  
In terms of the operation of nuclear power plants, the institutions 
primarily responsible for ensuring safety in accord with these general 
principles are the regulatory authority and the plant operator. The CNS 
speaks to the organization and responsibility of both.
69
 The capacity and 
commitment of the regulator and the regulated is critical to nuclear safety 
and, indeed, the outcome of the IAEA Action Plan. To developments with 
respect to these institutional arrangements we now turn. 
B. Regulatory Independence and Competence Are Key to Nuclear Safety 
The IAEA Action Plan encourages Member States to review their 
regulatory bodies, including “an assessment of their effective 
independence, adequacy of human and financial resources and the need for 
appropriate technical and scientific support, to fulfil their 
responsibilities.”70 The inclusion of such a recommendation in the Action 
Plan is not surprising given the sharp criticism of the Nuclear and 
 
 
 66. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, arts. 5, 20. For an assessment of the Convention’s effectiveness 
conducted from a U.S. perspective, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONVENTION ON 
NUCLEAR SAFETY IS VIEWED BY MOST MEMBER COUNTRIES AS STRENGTHENING SAFETY 
WORLDWIDE, GAO-10-489, at 7–29 (Apr. 2010), http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303698.pdf. 
 67. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, arts. 12–19. The obligations were based largely on the safety 
principles for nuclear installations contained in the IAEA’s Safety Fundamentals document, IAEA, 
The Safety of Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Series No. 110 (1993). IAEA, CNS Brochure: 
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), Introduction to the CNS and its Associated Rules of Procedure 
and Guidelines, at 4 (May 2010), available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/ni/safety_ 
convention/cns_2010_March.pdf.  
 68. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 10. 
 69. Id. arts. 8–9, 11; IAEA, Joint Convention, supra note 64, arts. 19–21 (mirrors provisions in 
the CNS with respect to these primary institutional responsibilities). 
 70. IAEA ACTION PLAN, supra note 53, at 3. 
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Industrial Safety Agency (“NISA”), the Japanese regulator, which is 
reflected in the official reviews of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
71
 
Questions were raised about NISA’s independence from those it regulated, 
its complacency, and its technical capacity.
72
  
The CNS identifies in brief terms several attributes of a regulatory 
body. The regulator is to be “provided with adequate authority, 
competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its assigned 
responsibilities,” and there is to be assurance of “an effective separation 
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body 
or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear 
energy.”73 However, no particular form of organization is prescribed. 
Thus, regulatory structures vary from country to country, with some taking 
the form of multi-member agencies or commissions, such as in the United 
States,
74
 Canada,
75
 Spain,
76
 and France,
77
 while other regulatory authorities 
 
 
 71. The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of 
Tokyo Electric Power Company committee was established by a Cabinet Decision on May 24, 2011. 
The committee released an interim report in December 2011, INVESTIGATION COMM. ON THE 
ACCIDENT AT THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS OF TOKYO ELEC. POWER CO. [ICANPS], 
INTERIM REPORT (2011) [hereinafter ICANPS, INTERIM REPORT], available at http://icanps.go.jp/eng/ 
interim-report.html, and a final report on July 23, 2012, ICANPS, FINAL REPORT (2012) [hereinafter 
ICANPS FINAL REPORT], http://icanps.go.jp/eng/final-report.html. The Japanese Diet established the 
National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, which 
issued a report on July 5, 2012, available in English translation. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2. 
 72. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, at 47–57; ICANPS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, at 
544–53, 594–96; ICANPS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 415–19. 
 73. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 8; see also IAEA, Joint Convention, supra note 64, arts. 19-
20 (using “independence” rather than “separation” regarding the organizational situation of the 
regulator). Further guidance on the meaning of these principles can be found in other IAEA 
publications. See, e.g., IAEA, Governmental, Legal and Framework for Safety, IAEA Doc. GSR Part 1 
(2010) (IAEA Safety Standards Series), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/ 
PDF/Pub1465_web.pdf; IAEA, Organization and Staffing of the Regulatory Body for Nuclear 
Facilities, § 3.4, IAEA Doc. GS-G-1.1 (2002); IAEA, Independence in Regulatory Decision Making 
IAEA Doc. INSAG-17 (2003). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency also acts as a forum for 
exchanging experience and information among regulators. See NEA, IMPROVING REGULATION: NEA 
REGULATORY GUIDANCE BOOKLETS (OECD 2011), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/pub/ 
improving-nuclear-regulation/index.html.  
 74. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) § 2(c), 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (2006). 
 75. Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9 (Can.). 
 76. Law Reforming the Act Creating the Nuclear Safety Council (B.O.E. 2007, No. 268) (Spain), 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007/11/08/pdfs/A45920-45932.pdf (unofficial English translation 
available through OECD NEA, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/spain/spain-nuclear-safety-
council-2007.pdf). 
 77. Loi 2006-686 du 13 juin 2006 relative à la transparence et à la sécurité en matière nucléaire 
[Law 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 on Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field] JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 14, 2006, No. 
0136, http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr (unofficial English translation available at http://www.french 
-nuclear-safety.fr/index.php/English-version/References). 
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are headed by a single director or administrator, sometimes organized 
within a ministry, such as in Germany
78
 and Sweden.
79
  
The overarching principle for regulatory authorities is independence—
or separation—from the developmental or promotional functions of 
government and, of course, the operator itself.
80
 The independence 
principle, like most if not all principles embedded in the CNS, reflects the 
consensus of experience in nuclear governance. It is an underlying 
principle, for example, that led the United States in 1974 to abolish the 
former U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and separate the regulatory and 
promotional responsibilities over nuclear energy between the NRC as an 
independent regulatory commission and what is now the Department of 
Energy.
81
 
Although the CNS also emphasizes the principle that the operator of a 
nuclear power plant bears primary responsibility for the safety of 
operations,
82
 the regulatory body is accountable for the effectiveness of its 
oversight of the operator. Accidents or even “near misses” often reveal 
weaknesses in the regulator. This observation is certainly true of the U.S. 
experience, most notably in the evaluations of the NRC after the Three 
Mile Island accident,
83
 but also in critiques of the agency’s regulatory 
 
 
 78. At the federal level the Federal Office for Radiation Protection is established within the 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety; German Länder also 
carry out some responsibilities for nuclear regulation. Gesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der 
Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz) [Law on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy and Protection against its Hazards (Atomic Law)] Dec. 23, 1959, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 
[BGBL I] at 821, § 24, no. 56 (Ger.), as amended by Neufassung des Atomgesetzes [Revision of the 
Atomic Law], July 15, 1985, BGBL I at 1576, § 24, no. 41; Gesetz über die Errichtung eines 
Bundesamtes für Strahlenschutz [Law on the Establishment of a Federal Office for Radiation 
Protection] Oct. 9, 1989, BGBL I at 1830, §§ 1–2, no. 47, as modified in Gesetz vom [Law of] May 3, 
2000, BGBL I at 636, art. 2, no. 20; see GOV’T OF THE FED. REPUB. OF GER., CONVENTION ON 
NUCLEAR SAFETY REPORT FOR THE FIFTH REVIEW MEETING 19–20, 40–46 (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.bfs.de/en/kerntechnik/CNS2011_ENG.pdf. 
 79. §§ 18, 24 MED INSTRUKTION FÖR STRÅLSÄKERHETSMYNDIGHETEN [Ordinance with 
Instructions for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2008:452) 
(Swed.), available at http://www.lagboken.se/files/SFS/2008/080452.PD (unofficial English text 
available at http://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/Global/IRRS/Ordinance%20with%20instruc 
tions%20for%20SSM.pdf).  
 80. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 8.2; IAEA, Joint Convention, supra note 64, art. 20.2; C. 
STOIBER, A. BAER, N. PELZER & W. TONHAUSER, HANDBOOK ON NUCLEAR LAW 26 (2003) 
[hereinafter STOIBER, HANDBOOK], available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub 
1160_web.pdf. 
 81. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA) § 2(c), 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (2006); S. Rept. No. 93-
980, at 19 (1974). 
 82. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 9; STOIBER, HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 68.  
 83. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, 
THE NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF THREE MILE ISLAND 51–56 (1979); NRC SPECIAL INQUIRY 
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oversight of licensed activities that did not result in any accident or 
radioactive release.
84
 In Canada, the regulator’s handling of the suspension 
of operation of a small reactor that produced radioisotopes for medical use 
led to the removal of the commission’s chair in what some considered a 
challenge to the independence of the regulator.
85
 Whether or not one hews 
to the proposition that regulators are inevitably “captured” by those they 
are charged with regulating, the credibility and effectiveness of the 
regulator is something that requires watchful attention. 
The reports of the official investigations of the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, particularly that of the commission established by the National 
Diet, contain blistering criticisms of the Japanese regulatory body. The 
accident itself is characterized as primarily a “manmade disaster” resulting 
from the “collusion between government, regulators, and TEPCO,” the 
electric utility operating the plants.
86
 The independence of the regulator 
was deemed a “mockery.”87 Its performance in setting safety standards and 
enforcing them as well as its response in an emergency were found 
wanting.
88
 As the Diet report recounted, separation of the regulatory body 
in Japan had long been wanting both in appearance and in fact.
89
 At the 
time of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the regulator NISA was organized 
under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”), which also 
carried responsibility for nuclear power development. This organization 
persisted despite suggestions in an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review 
Service (“IRRS”) peer review of the Japanese regulatory system and 
questions raised during review meetings of the CNS.
90
 
Even before the final reports of the review commissions, Japan took 
steps toward reform of its regulatory system and capability to deal with 
 
 
GROUP, THREE MILE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND TO THE PUBLIC, NUREG/CR-
1250, at 112–14 (1980). 
 84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-415, NRC NEEDS TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY 
AND COMPREHENSIVELY RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT’S 
SHUTDOWN 1 (May 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242288.pdf. 
 85. B. MacKenzie, The Independence of the Nuclear Regulator, Notes from the Canadian 
Experience, 85 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 35 (2010). 
 86. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, Exec. Summary, at 16, http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/ 
pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/index.html.  
 87. Id. at 20. 
 88. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, Main Report, §§ 3.2, 5.2, 5.4, http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/ 
info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/NAIIC_Eng_Chapter5_web.pdf; 
ICANPS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 71, § VI.8, at 544–54. 
 89. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, Main Report, § 5.4.3. 
 90. Id. at 58–60. Normally, an IRRS mission is followed by a return mission within three years, 
but METI is said to have delayed the follow-up mission scheduled in February 2010. Id. at 59.  
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nuclear emergencies. A Cabinet decision was made in August 2011 to 
reconstitute the regulatory structure responsible for nuclear safety 
regulation.
91
 The government submitted a bill to the Diet in January 2012 
to establish the Nuclear Regulatory Authority headed by a single 
commissioner and organized under the Ministry of Environment.
92
 The 
opposition parties submitted a counterproposal to the Diet in April 2012 
that proposed a multi-member commission.
93
 Ultimately, the government 
and the opposition parties agreed to a reform proposal in a new bill that 
was submitted to the Diet and adopted on June 27, 2012.
94
 The bill also 
included provisions for strengthening the capability for emergency 
response through the establishment of the Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness Commission (“NEPC”) under the Cabinet. On September 
19, 2012, the new Nuclear Regulation Authority began operation as a five-
member independent commission under the Ministry of Environment with 
responsibility for safety and security of nuclear installations. Under other 
provisions of the legislation, the Nuclear Regulation Authority must 
prepare new safety regulations to address, for example, severe accident 
management. 
C. States Turn to Regulatory Reform 
The impetus for regulatory reform in Japan is understandable—but is it 
an isolated event? Interestingly enough, the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) accomplished its own reform in October 2011, driven in part by its 
assessment of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Korea’s regulator, the 
Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety (“KINS”), had been organized under 
the Ministry of Education, Science & Technology (“MEST”), which also 
had the responsibility for nuclear research and development.
95
 This 
 
 
 91. GOV’T OF JAPAN, CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY NATIONAL REPORT OF JAPAN FOR THE 
SECOND EXTRAORDINARY MEETING, § B4.3, at 28-29 (July 2012), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/ 
english/press/2012/pdf/0705_01b.pdf (providing a synopsis of the steps Japan has taken toward 
reform).  
 92. Statement of Japanese Cabinet, Reform of Japan’s Nuclear Safety Regulation (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/info/kokusaiws/siryo/reform_of_regulation.pdf. 
 93. See News Release, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Japanese Political Parties Begin Debate 
on New Nuclear Power Regulatory Organization in Lower House (June 4, 2012), http://www.jaif.or.jp/ 
english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS01_1338802034P.pdf. 
 94. Genshiryoku kisei iinkai secchi ho [Act for Establishment of a Nuclear Regulation 
Authority], Law No. 47 of 2012 (Japan); 90 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 217 (2012) (forthcoming) (providing 
excerpts of the new law in English). 
 95. REPUBLIC OF KOREA, FIFTH NATIONAL REPORT FOR THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY 
25, 32–43 (Sept. 2010), http://210.218.197.2/pdf/Convention%20on%20Nuclear%20Safety%2020 
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organizational structure is comparable to the structure in Japan before the 
changes under the 2012 legislation. As a result of its reform legislation, 
Korea established a new Nuclear Safety and Security Commission 
(“NSSC”) in October 2011.96 NSSC now reports directly to the 
president,
97
 and two institutes, the KINS and the Korea Institute of 
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, are transferred from MEST to 
NSSC as technical support organizations.
98
  
Although not a direct outcome of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the 
United Kingdom has moved over the past few years toward a restructuring 
of its regulatory system over nuclear power plants as part of its broader 
energy strategy that includes support for new nuclear plant construction. 
Nuclear regulation had been organized in several entities under the Health 
and Safety Executive (“HSE”) Nuclear Directorate, including the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate, the Office for Civil Nuclear Security, and the 
United Kingdom Safeguards Office.
99
 A 2008 report to the government 
recommended changes to enhance the capability, visibility, and 
organizational capacity of the regulator in the United Kingdom, 
particularly if the government was to pursue a policy of new nuclear 
construction.
100
 Pending introduction of legislation, the new Office of 
Nuclear Regulation (“ONR”) was established as a body within the HSE 
that consolidated disparate regulatory functions.
101
 Under the Energy Bill 
pending in Parliament at the end of 2012, the ONR would be established 
 
 
10.pdf. 
 96. 법률제10912호(원자력안전위원회의 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률) [Establishment and Operation of 
Nuclear Safety and Security Commission], Act No. 10912, Oct. 26, 2011, art. 3 (S. Kor.), 
http://gwanbo.korea.go.kr/main.gz; 88 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 173, 173–79 (2011) (providing excerpts of 
the new law in English). 
 97. Act No. 10912, Oct. 26, 2011, art. 3.1 (S. Kor.) 
 98. Organization, KOREAN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SEC. COMM’N [NSSC], http://www.nssc.go 
.kr/nssc/english/introduction/organogram.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2013); South Korea’s Regulatory 
Changes, NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INT’L (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp 
?storyCode=2062223. 
 99. See THE UNITED KINGDOM’S FIFTH NATIONAL REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY OBLIGATIONS 54–66 (Oct. 2010), http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/ 
decc/What%20we%20do/UK%20energy%20supply/Energy%20mix/Nuclear/issues/safety/internationa
l/731-uk-5th-nuclear-safety-obs.pdf (describing the earlier organization). 
 100. TIM STONE, NUCLEAR REGULATORY REVIEW PRIVATE ADVICE AND REASONING, 
OBSERVATIONS BY TIM STONE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
33–37 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/What%20we%20do/UK%20 
energy%20supply/Energy%20mix/Nuclear/whitepaper08/1_20091116131031_e_@@_nuclearreviews
toneadvice.pdf.  
 101. See Statement of Chris Grayling, Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Feb. 
8, 2011), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110208/ 
wmstext/110208 m0001.htm#11020828000008.  
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as a separate statutory entity, separate from the government but 
accountable through the Secretary of State who appoints the Chief Nuclear 
Inspector and other members of the ONR and approves ONR’s five year 
strategic plans.
102
 
India, another country with an eye toward new nuclear generation, has 
also taken steps toward regulatory reform. India’s current regulatory body 
is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (“AERB”).103 The AERB and the 
Department of Atomic Energy currently fall under the purview of Atomic 
Energy Commission (the head of the department is also the chair of the 
Commission), which is accountable to the government.
104
 As such, the 
current organization reflects the potential conflict between the promotional 
and regulatory sides of nuclear energy that the CNS charges states to 
avoid. As discussed earlier in this article, the lack of separation or 
independence of the regulator from governmental bodies responsible for 
nuclear promotion or development has led to recent regulatory 
restructuring in Japan and Korea since the Fukushima accident and was 
the impetus for such change several decades ago in the United States. A 
radiation incident in 2010, as well as reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, prompted the introduction in the Indian parliament of a reform 
bill in 2011 to create an independent multi-member Nuclear Safety 
Regulatory Authority.
105
 The Indian bill also created a Council of Nuclear 
Safety, headed by the prime minister and including a position for the chair 
of the Atomic Energy Commission to review policies on nuclear safety.
106
 
A parliamentary standing committee issued a report in March 2012 
criticizing a number of aspects of the bill, including provisions related to 
the membership of the Council of Nuclear Safety and others that could 
adversely affect the autonomy of the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority 
 
 
 102. Energy Bill, 2012-13, H.C. Bill [100], sch. 7, §§ 2–4, 12(5) (U.K.), available at http://www 
.publications .parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0100/cbill_2012-20130100_en_1.htm.  
 103. S.O. 4772 under the Atomic Energy Act of 1962, 1983, 5180 Gazette of India, part II, 
section.3(II), 25 (Dec. 31, 1983) (India), available at http://www.aerb.gov.in/cgi-bin/constitution/ 
gazzette.asp (establishing the AERB).  
 104. See COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA, PERFORMANCE AUDIT ON ACTIVITIES 
OF ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (DEP’T OF ATOMIC ENERGY), Rep. No. 9 of 2012–13, at 1–
6, 12–13 (Mar. 2012), available at http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/ 
Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/2012_2013/SD/Report_9/ReportNo
_9.html.  
 105. Id. at 11. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, No. 76 of 2011, §§ 8–9 (India), available 
at http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-nuclear-safety-regulatory-authority-bill-2011-1980/.  
 106. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, No. 76 of 2011, sec. 5 (India), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-nuclear-safety-regulatory-authority-bill-2011-1980/. 
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(“NSRA”).107 At about the same time, the Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India issued a report sharply criticizing the performance and 
organization of the AERB, the current Indian regulator.
108
 As of the 
writing of this Article, the bill remains pending in the Indian parliament.  
Whether other reforms will come is yet to be seen. The international 
system continues to rely on the peer review system established under the 
CNS and further fostered through the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (“IRRS”) that conducts reviews of national regulatory 
programs. At the extraordinary meeting of the CNS in August 2012 and in 
the ministerial conference in Japan in December 2012, the Contracting 
States again emphasized the importance of ensuring the effective 
independence of the regulatory body in making regulatory judgments and 
taking enforcement action as well as ensuring that regulators are separated 
from promotional entities.
109
 Also underscored were the importance of the 
regulator having financial and human resources, competent staff, and 
access as needed to external sources of expertise along with the regulator 
operating in a “transparent and open manner.”110 For the next review 
meeting, the parties agreed that national reports should address 
“[m]easures taken or planned to ensure the effective independence of the 
regulatory body from undue influence, including, where appropriate, 
information on the hosting of IRRS missions.”111 
 
 
 107. DEP’T-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., ENV’T & FORESTS, 
TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIRST REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
BILL, 2011 (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Nuclear%20Safety/ 
NSRA%20Bill%202011_%20Standing%20Com%20Report.pdf.  
 108. See COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 104, vi-viii. 
 109. IAEA, Final Summary Report, 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of the contracting Parties to the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety, at 11, IAEA Doc. CNS/ExM/2012/04/Rev.2 (Aug. 31, 2012) 
[hereinafter 2nd Extraordinary Meeting Report], available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ 
Documents/Conventions/cns-summaryreport310812.pdf. The Swiss Federation offered proposals, inter 
alia, to amend the CNS to require contracting parties to subject their respective regulatory authority to 
a review by external experts and to remove provisions allowing reports to the convention and the 
debates to be confidential. Id. At the December 2012 Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear 
Safety, one of the working groups reporting to the conference noted that the accident  
reminds us of the imperative of establishing an effective nuclear safety regulatory framework, 
including an independent (in law, practice and culture) effective expert regulator that is 
credible, trusted, competent and adequately resourced. To achieve this objective, it is vital to 
recognize the importance of scientific and technical knowledge and expertise in taking 
effective, optimized regulatory decisions. 
IAEA, Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, Chairperson Summary, Working Session 
1, ¶ 4 (Dec. 15–17, 2012), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2012/20120216/2012 
0216_CSummaries.pdf. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 2nd Extraordinary Meeting Report, supra note 109, at 7, ¶ 23(e). 
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D. Nuclear Safety Starts with Plant Operator Accountability 
Although the foregoing discussion has focused on the impetus for 
strengthening the regulatory body in carrying out its responsibilities, a few 
words should be said about the entity that holds the front line 
responsibility for safety—the plant operator. The CNS, being an 
agreement among States, speaks to the responsibility of the operator—the 
“license holder”—through the lens of the State’s responsibility: “Each 
Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a 
nuclear installation rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall 
take the appropriate steps to ensure that each such license holder meets its 
responsibility.”112 
As with the regulator NISA, the investigations of the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident exposed substantial shortcomings in TEPCO, the licensed 
operator of the Fukushima Daiichi power plants. These shortcomings 
range from TEPCO’s failure to take measures that could have prevented or 
mitigated the impact of the tsunami before it occurred, to poor 
management of the accident and ineffective implementation of emergency 
protective measures.
113
 The recalcitrance of the Federation of Electric 
Power Companies of Japan, an industry association, to work toward safety 
improvements to address seismic and tsunami threats is also blamed as 
contributing to the accident.
114
 
In taking steps to improve the effectiveness of plant-operating 
organizations, the IAEA Action Plan stresses actions by States to improve 
“management systems, safety culture, human resources management, and 
scientific and technical capacity” of plant operators.115 States are also 
urged to host an Operational Safety Review Team (“OSART”) mission 
during the coming three years, a peer review program that looks at the 
safety of plants.
116
 The plan also calls for strengthening cooperation 
between the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(“WANO”) “to enhance information exchange on operating experience 
and on other relevant safety and engineering areas and, in consultation 
with other relevant stakeholders, to explore mechanisms to enhance 
 
 
 112. IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 9. Article 11 speaks to ensuring the availability of financial 
resources and qualified staff throughout the life of the installation. Id. art. 11. 
 113. See generally NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, Exec. Summary, at 16-18, 20; id., Main 
Report, §§ 5.1–5.3; ICANPS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 71, Exec. Summary, at 24–25, 30. 
 114. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, §§ 5.1, 5.2, 5.2.2. 
 115. IAEA ACTION PLAN, supra note 53, at 4. 
 116. Id. 
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communication and interaction among operating organizations.”117 This 
latter recommendation is of interest because it calls directly for greater 
cooperation with industry-based organizations in the interest of safety 
improvements. 
WANO was established in 1989 after the Chernobyl accident, a non-
profit organization with the purpose of providing peer reviews, some 
technical support, and sharing operational experience among its members, 
some 440 plant operators across the world.
118
 WANO’s organization and 
staff are based in four regional centers (Atlanta, Tokyo, Moscow, and 
Paris) and a central coordinating center in London.  
WANO followed the earlier establishment by the nuclear industry in 
the United States of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (“INPO”) 
after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. INPO has acted in many 
respects as an industry self-regulatory body in the United States, and can 
be said to have brought together an otherwise fragmented industry of 
disparate operators.
119
 INPO conducts periodic evaluations of plant 
performance and corporate management, accredits training programs, and 
evaluates events and operating experience.
120
 While not a substitute for 
regulatory oversight of the NRC, INPO and NRC have established a 
memorandum of agreement with respect to communication of safety 
information.
121
 
At the ministerial forum held in connection with the G8 meeting in 
Paris in June 2011, WANO’s President suggested greater emphasis on 
emergency management, fuel storage, and design as areas to complement 
its core peer evaluation process.
122
 In September 2012, IAEA and WANO 
 
 
 117.  IAEA ACTION PLAN, supra note 53, at 4. 
 118. About Us, WANO, http://www.wano.info/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).  
 119. See JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR 
SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 42–44 (Univ. of Chicago 1994); see also EDWARD BLANDFORD & 
MICHAEL MAY, LESSONS LEARNED FROM “LESSONS LEARNED”: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR 
POWER SAFETY AFTER ACCIDENTS AND NEAR ACCIDENTS 11–13 (2012) [hereinafter BLANDFORD & 
MAY, LESSONS LEARNED], http://www.amacad.org/pdfs/lessonsLearned.pdf. In the assessment in the 
wake of the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, INPO was viewed as a potential model for self-
policing by the oil industry to enhance safe operations. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE 
FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 235–42 (Jan. 2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report. 
 120. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FIFTH NATIONAL REPORT 
FOR THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY 181-93, NUREG-1650, Rev. 3 (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.balch.com/files/upload/Safety%20Report%2010.10.pdf.  
 121. See id. at 177. 
 122. OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORUM ON THE FUKUSHIMA 
ACCIDENT: INSIGHTS AND APPROACHES 10, 87–94, OECD Doc. NEA/CNRA/R(2012)12 (Nov. 30, 
2011). 
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concluded an updated memorandum of understanding to enhance 
cooperation and coordination on nuclear safety matters.
123
 Such 
cooperation covers their respective performance indicator programs, 
exchange documents on operating experience, exchange of information 
during a serious incident at a nuclear installation, and providing staff 
support to each other’s review teams as needed.124 
In Japan itself, Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan have 
recently established the Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (“JANSI”), which 
is intended to provide evaluation and support to nuclear operators along 
the lines of the INPO model.
125
 JANSI will maintain relations with both 
INPO and WANO to seek guidance and peer review.
126
 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the focus at an international level 
on improving the effectiveness of regulatory bodies and the accountability 
of operators will largely take place in the context of the incentive regime 
established by the CNS and related conventions. The actual task of 
strengthening the regulator will essentially rest with national governments. 
Structural changes to enhance the independence and the capacity of the 
regulatory bodies in accordance with the principles articulated in the CNS 
are important steps to enable effective oversight and build public 
confidence. Improving the capacity and corporate responsibility of those 
organizations that operate plants rests in the first instance with the 
operators themselves but should be closely monitored through active and 
vigorous oversight by the competent regulatory body.  
Is this too much to ask? Within the shared framework of international 
peer review, perhaps not if States and operators are prepared to embrace 
and carry out the principles of the IAEA Action Plan. Strengthening 
institutional capacity is a necessary, even if by itself insufficient, step to 
achieving improvement in nuclear safety.  
 
 
 123. IAEA Press Release, IAEA and WANO Sign New Memorandum of Understanding (Sept. 17, 
2012), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2012/prn201222.html.  
 124. Id. As one commentary notes, however, WANO’s assessments may have less of an impact 
than do INPO’s. BLANDFORD & MAY, LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 119, at 13. 
 125. Statement of Makoto Yagi, Chairman, The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan 
(Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/news/message/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/ 
11/16/press_E_20121115.pdf. 
 126. Japanese Industry Bolsters Nuclear Safety Cooperation, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Nov. 16, 
2012), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-japanese_industry_bolsters_nuclear_safety_coopera 
tion-1611124.html. 
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III. A GLOBAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME 
Although implementing strengthened safety policies and practices and 
improving the capability of regulators and operators are important 
contributors to reducing the risk of nuclear power plant failures, the risk of 
accidents cannot be entirely eliminated. This Part discusses the liability 
regimes that apply in the event an accident does occur. The Fukushima 
Daiichi accident brings a new focus to the discussion of international 
liability regimes, one that is not merely about theoretical problems of the 
impacts of a nuclear accident. But unlike our discussion of regulatory and 
corporate failure in the preceding section of this commentary, the Japanese 
experience in responding to the accident is more a cautionary tale for 
others than it is a demonstration of a failure to ensure that basic principles 
of nuclear operation and regulation were followed. 
To put the recommendation in the IAEA Action Plan in context, it is 
worth recalling how we got to where we are today, with several primary 
international instruments on liability, but with a large number of countries, 
including Japan, that lie outside of any of the regimes. This Part begins by 
providing a background of the existing global nuclear liability instruments. 
Then it explains the fundamental principles of a global nuclear liability 
regime. Next it discusses the present status of acceptance by States for the 
existing global nuclear liability instruments, including any partial 
acceptance of the fundamental principles in national legislation. This Part 
finishes with recommendations to achieving a global nuclear liability 
regime. 
A. Background of Existing International Nuclear Liability Instruments 
With the emergence of civilian nuclear power development in the mid-
1950s, the question of a need for a special liability regime soon arose in 
view of the perceived special and uncertain hazards of nuclear operations 
as well as the potentially far-reaching consequences of a nuclear accident 
that might cross national borders. Whether private investment in and 
development of nuclear energy, despite its promise, would occur absent 
some regime that managed risks and balanced the interests of victims and 
operators was an open question.
127
 In the United States, Congress adopted 
 
 
 127. See, e.g., Exposé des Motifs of the Paris Convention (rev.) § 2, approved by OECD Council 
(Nov. 16, 1982), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_motif.html. In the United States, 
the main goals of the Price Anderson Act in establishing the U.S. liability regime were articulated in 
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the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 to establish a nuclear liability scheme for 
a nascent nuclear industry.
128
 At about the same time in Europe, the then 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation—now the OECD—
gathered legal experts to explore the development of a legal instrument 
that would “provide a uniform system for all Western European 
countries.”129 These efforts led to the adoption in 1960 of the Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy.
130
 
Of course, the 1960 Paris Convention, which entered into force in 
1968, was only the first step toward the development of an international 
nuclear third party liability regime. After the adoption of the Paris 
Convention in 1960, the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention was adopted in 1963
131
 (and entered into force in 1974) to 
provide additional funds to compensate damage as a result of a nuclear 
incident where Paris Convention funds proved to be insufficient. The Paris 
Convention itself was modified by two protocols adopted in 1964 and 
1982.
132
 The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
 
 
its preamble as (1) providing confidence to the industry that it would not face unreasonable risk from 
participation in the nuclear program; (2) assuring the public that it would be compensated for injuries 
that could result from a nuclear accident; and (3) protecting the federal treasury from unnecessary 
exposure. Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 1, 71 Stat. 576 (1957); see Jason Zorn, Compensation in the Event of 
a Terrorist Attack on A Nuclear Power Plant: Will Victims Be Adequately Protected?, 38 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1087, 1105-07 (2003) (synopsis of development of Price Anderson Act). 
 128. Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (adding § 170 to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 
§ U.S.C. 2210). The initial Price Anderson scheme provided for a level of public funding of 
compensation in addition to private insurance carried by the operator, but the modernized scheme, in 
effect since 1982, is based on insurance and a retrospective premium imposed on all operators. See 
Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM & MARY ENV’L L. & POL’Y REV. 
219, 240–44 (2008) [hereinafter Faure & Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage], available at 
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=wmelpr. 
 129. Exposé des Motifs of the Paris Convention (rev.), supra note 127, § 3. See Tom Vanden 
Borre, Shifts in Governance in Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 20 years after Chernobyl, in TORT 
AND INSURANCE LAW, VOL. 21, SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 262–66 
(Michael Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 2007) (describing origins of international nuclear liability law).  
 130. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 
U.N.T.S. 251 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at http:// 
treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20956/volume-956-i-13706-english.pdf. 
 131. Convention Supplementary to the [Paris Convention], concluded at Brussels, Jan. 31, 1963, 
1041 U.N.T.S. 358 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1974) [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary 
Convention], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201041/volume-1041 
-I-13706-English.pdf. The Brussels Supplementary Convention was amended by a Protocol adopted 
Nov. 16, 1982, 1650 U.N.T.S. 446 (entered into force Aug. 1, 1991), available at http://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201650/v1650.pdf. 
 132. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy, Jan. 28, 1964, 956 U.N.T.S. 335 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1968), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20956/v956.pdf; Protocol to Amend the [Paris 
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was also adopted in 1963 and came into force in 1977.
133
 The Vienna 
Convention is open to all States; the Paris Convention is open to any 
OECD Member and to any non-member with the consent of the other 
contracting parties. 
The 1986 Chernobyl accident underscored the limitations of the 
international regimes to protect Member States when a major nuclear 
energy country in close proximity did not adhere. Just as the Chernobyl 
accident provided the catalyst for adoption of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety and other instruments focused on emergency response and 
assistance, it also gave impetus to the search for further improvements in 
the nuclear liability regime.
134
 The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the 
Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
135
 
provided a bridge between those two conventions and thereby broadened 
the geographic scope of the conventions’ coverage. Further, in 1997 
negotiations were completed on two instruments under IAEA auspices: the 
Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage
136
 and a new instrument, the Convention on Supplementary 
 
 
Convention], as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, concluded at Paris, Nov. 16, 
1982, 1519 U.N.T.S. 329 (entered into force on Oct. 7. 1988), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/UNTS/Volume%201519/volume-1519-I-13706-English.pdf. A consolidated text of the 
Paris Convention reflecting the 1964 and 1982 amending protocols is available at http://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html. There are 16 parties to the Paris Convention as amended through 1982, 
primarily in Western Europe and Turkey. Austria and Luxembourg also signed the convention. 
NEA, Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability—Latest Status of Ratifications or 
Accessions, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-ratification.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2013).  
 133. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature May 21, 
1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 266 (entered into force Nov. 12, 1977) [hereinafter Vienna Convention], 
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201063/volume-1063-I-16197-
English.pdf. There are currently 38 parties, including much of Eastern Europe and the Russian 
Federation. See Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA, http://www.iaea 
.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 134. See J. Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to 
Chernobyl, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD 37, 44–53 (2006), 
available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/chernobyl/. 
 135. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention, opened for signature Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force Apr. 27, 
1992), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201672/v1672.pdf; see Joint 
Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, IAEA (Aug. 
29, 2012), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot_status.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2013) (latest status of signature and ratification). 
 136. Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened 
for signature Sept. 29, 1997, 2241 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Oct. 4, 2003) [hereinafter 1997 
Revised Vienna Convention], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume% 
202241/v2241.pdf.  
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Compensation for Nuclear Damage (“CSC”).137 These developments were 
followed by negotiations concluded in 2004 by which the Paris 
Convention Member States adopted revisions to modernize the Paris 
Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention.
138
 
B. Fundamental Principles of a Global Nuclear Liability Regime 
In general, the liability conventions have coalesced around several 
major principles that continue to inform the liability regimes: 
 Strict liability: Victims need not prove fault or negligence in 
seeking compensation; 
 Exclusive liability: All liability is channeled to the facility 
operator;
139
  
 Provision of financial security: Arrangements are made to ensure 
availability of funds to cover liability obligations; 
 Unity of jurisdiction: Jurisdiction is focused, generally, in a 
single court of the State where the incident occurred to facilitate 
access to justice and avoid forum shopping; and 
 Non-discrimination: The relevant convention and national 
legislation apply to all victims, regardless of their nationality, 
domicile or residence.
140
 
 
 
 137. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature 
Sept. 29, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1473 [hereinafter CSC], available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ 
Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc567.shtml (awaiting sufficient signatures to be entered into force).  
 138. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 
29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocols of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 
November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention], available at 
http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-protocol.html (awaiting sufficient signatures to be 
entered into force); Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by the 
Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004 
[hereinafter 2004 Protocol to Amend Brussels Supplementary Convention], available at http:// 
www.oecd-nea.org/law/brussels-supplementary-convention-protocol.htmlnvention (awaiting sufficient 
signatures to be entered into force). 
 139. On this point, the United States departs from the general principles because the scheme under 
the Price Anderson Act provides for economic as opposed to legal channeling. See Ben McRae, The 
Compensation Convention: Path to a Global Regime for Dealing with Legal Liability and 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 61 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 25, 29 n.14 (1998). 
 140. See generally J. Schwartz, Liability and Compensation for Third Party Damage Resulting 
from a Nuclear Incident, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: HISTORY EVOLUTION AND OUTLOOK 
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Two other principles also shape the liability regimes and have evolved 
since the original conventions were adopted: 
 Liability limited in amount: Under the early rationale for a 
special liability regime, a limitation on liability was part of the 
balance of the interests of victims and operators—e.g., strict and 
exclusive liability would ease the path toward compensation for 
victims, whereas liability limits would protect the nascent 
industry from ruinous claims. The modernized regimes have 
moved toward higher liability limits, but also allow the 
possibility of unlimited liability.
141
 
 Liability limited in time: The 1960 Paris Convention and the 
1963 Vienna Convention prescribe 10 years from the accident as 
the time limitation to bring claims. The 1997
142
 and 2004
143
 
modernized versions of those conventions extend the period to 
30 years for personal injury, whereas the 1997 CSC provides 10 
years for all types of damage.
144
 
These fundamental principles of a nuclear liability regime have 
developed over time and are generally accepted.  
 
 
307, 307–16 (OECD 2010), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/isnl/10th/isnl-10th-anniversary 
.pdf; STOIBER, HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 109–16. 
 141. For example, Article 7(b) of the 1960 Paris Convention, supra note 130, capped liability at 
15 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the equivalent of about $23 million under the valuation 
system used by the International Monetary Fund. SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). Under Article 
I.H(a) of the 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 138, the operator’s liability shall 
not be less than €700 million. Article V.1. & 3. of the Vienna Convention, supra note 133, set the 
operator’s liability at a minimum of $5 million in terms of a specified value of the U.S. dollar in terms 
of gold, i.e., $35 per one troy ounce of fine gold. Article 7.1 of the 1997 Revised Vienna Convention, 
supra note 136, sets the minimum amount of operator liability at 300 million SDRs, which may be 
made up in part by public funds. The CSC, supra note 137, art III.1.(a)(1), provides for operator 
liability in the minimum amount of 300 million SDRs. See Faure & Vanden Borre, Compensating 
Nuclear Damage, supra note 128, at 234, 235 n.67, 236–40 (comparing liability regimes using SDR 
values as of July 2008); Norbert Pelzer, Main Features of the Revised International Regime Governing 
Nuclear Liability – Progress and Standstill, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: HISTORY EVOLUTION 
AND OUTLOOK 355, 367–69 (OECD 2010) [hereinafter Pelzer, Main Features]. 
 142. 1997 Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 136, art. 8(I). 
 143. 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 138, art I (recommending replacement 
of art. 8 of the Paris Convention currently in force). 
 144. CSC, supra note 137, annex, art. 9.1. 
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C. The Present Status of Acceptance of a Global Nuclear Liability Regime 
Despite the general consensus on such principles and the apparent 
progress to modernize the conventions and draw new States into the 
international regime, progress toward a global regime seemed to flounder 
even before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Although the United States 
has ratified the CSC, that instrument has only been ratified by a few other 
States and has yet to enter into force for want of sufficient member States 
with the requisite installed nuclear generating capacity.  
The 2004 protocols revising the Paris and Brussels Conventions have 
also yet to enter into force.
145
 Several governments, including the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey, have yet to take the final steps 
needed for ratification, and the European Union has instructed its members 
that ratification may only occur simultaneously when all EU members 
have taken the necessary preparatory steps to do so.
146
 The 1997 Protocol 
to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage,
147
 although in force, has only 10 contracting parties (and not all 
of them are nuclear-generating states).
148
  
Moreover, a number of States with significant nuclear energy capacity 
are not part of any regime. IAEA data lists 437 operating reactors around 
the world with another 68 under construction.
149
 About 380 of these units 
 
 
 145. See supra note 138. 
 146. Council Decision 2004/294, art. 2.1, 2001 O.J. (L 97) 53, 54, available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:097:0053:0054:EN:PDF. The Council urged 
ratification by December 31, 2006. Id. 
 147. 1997 Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 136. 
 148. IAEA, Status of Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, IAEA Reg. No. 1759 (May 29, 2012), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ 
Documents/Conventions/protamend_status.pdf. Importantly, the newest contracting member of the 
1997 Protocol, the United Arab Emirates, is a state newly embarked on a civilian nuclear energy 
program. UAE First “Newcomer” in 27 Years to Start Nuclear Power Plant Construction, IAEA 
(Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2012/uaenewcomer.html. The Russian Federation 
ratified the 1963 Vienna Convention in 2005. О ратификации Венской конвенции о гражданской 
ответственности за ядерный ущерб O ratifikatsii Venskoi konventsii o grazhdanskoi otvetstvennosti 
za iadernyi ushcherb [On Ratification of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Mar. 24, 2005, No. 3727 (Russ.), http://www.rg.ru/ 
2005/03/24/uscherb-dok.html. It has not adopted the 1997 protocol. See Press Release, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release Concerning Russia’s Ratification of the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.un.int/russia/ 
pressrel/2005/050331eprel.pdf. 
 149. IAEA, The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, supra note 44. These numbers represent a 
slight increase over 2011 in both categories. See IAEA, NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN THE WORLD 
10–11 (2012), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/8954/Nuclear-Power-Reactors 
-in-the-World-2012-Edition (there are currently 435 reactors in operation and 65 under construction).  
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under construction or in operation are in eight states: Canada, China, 
France, India, Japan, South Korea, the Russia Federation, and the United 
States. Several of these States—Canada, China, Japan, Korea, and India—
are not members of any regime, and the United States is a party to a 
regime not yet in force, the CSC.
150
 That leaves approximately 245 
operating plants and 48 plants under construction—about 58% of the 
world total—outside the scope of an international third party liability 
regime currently in force.
151
 
This is not to say that States that have yet to join an international 
convention are ignoring the issue of providing a liability and 
compensation regime applicable to nuclear accidents. A number have 
adopted relevant national legislation that reflects the general principles 
previously discussed.
152
 Perhaps the best illustration is Japan, which has 
undertaken extraordinary efforts to implement its national nuclear liability 
scheme to address the profound demands of compensating losses in the 
wake of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident.
153
  
The Japanese government moved purposefully to develop guidelines 
for compensation under its statutory scheme and established the 
mechanisms to fund compensation in amounts that exceeded the required 
financial assurance carried by the operator.
154
 The Japanese experience 
 
 
 150. See IAEA, The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors, supra note 44. 
 151. In addition to the reactors in operation or under construction in Canada, China, India, Japan, 
Korea, and the United States, Iran, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan are not parties to a liability 
regime and currently operate or have under construction power reactors. Id.  
 152. For example, Canada has its Nuclear Liability Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-28, http://laws-lois 
.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-28/FullText.html, whereas in China, the current liability regime is largely 
based on a State Council Reply. [Official Reply of the State Council to Questions on the Liabilities of 
Compensation for Damages Resulting From Nuclear Accident] (promulgated by St. Council, Guo Han 
[2007] No. 64) (China), reprinted in 80 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 78–79, 103–04 (OECD 2007), http://www 
.oecd-nea.org/law/nlb/nlb-80/documents/103_104_TextChina.pdf; [Reply of the State Council to the 
Ministry of Nuclear Industry, the State Administration of Nuclear Safety and the State Council 
Nuclear Power Leading Group on Disposal of the Matter of Nuclear Third Party] (promulgated by St. 
Council, Guo Han [1986] No. 44) (China) 
 153. Shigekazu Matsuura, The Current Progress of Relief of Victims of Nuclear Damage Caused 
by Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident, in JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR 
DAMAGE 29 (OECD 2012), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/fukushima/7089-fukushima-
compensation-system-pp.pdf; Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, Fukushima: Liability and Compensation, 
29.2 NEA NEWS 9 (2011), http://www.oecd-nea.org/nea-news/2011/29-2/nea-news-29-2-fukushima-
e.pdf. 
 154. Yasufumi Takahashi, The Financial Support by the Nuclear Damage Compensation 
Facilitation Corporation, in JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 41 (OECD 
2012) [hereinafter Takahashi, Financial Support]; Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni Kansuru Hōritsu 
[Compensation for Nuclear Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, as amended by Law No. 19 of 2009, § 16 
(Japan), reprinted in 84 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 159, 166 (2009); Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō 
Keiyaku ni kansuru Hōritsu [Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage], Law No. 
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after the Fukushima Daiichi accident highlights a number of areas of 
interest for liability and insurance experts: for example, the provision for 
unlimited liability of the operator under Japanese law,
 155
 the decision that 
the operator could not take the benefit of an exemption from liability for 
accidents caused by a “grave natural disaster,”156 and the allowance of 
compensation for certain kinds of damage,
157
 such as “rumour-related” 
damage.
158
 
As part of the call for improving the effectiveness of the international 
legal framework, the IAEA Action Plan asks 
Member States to work towards establishing a global nuclear 
liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might 
be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing 
appropriate compensation for nuclear damage. The IAEA 
International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) to 
recommend actions to facilitate achievement of such a global 
regime. Member States to give due consideration to the possibility 
of joining the international nuclear liability instruments as a step 
toward achieving such a global regime.
159
  
 
 
148 of 1961, as amended by Law No. 19 of 2009, § 2 (Japan), reprinted in 84 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 171 
(2009). 
 155. Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Law No. 147 of 1961, as amended by Law No. 19 of 
2009, § 3 (Japan), reprinted in 84 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 159, 161 (2009). 
 156. Taiga Uranaka, Japan Says No Limits to TEPCO Liability from Nuclear Disaster, REUTERS 
(May 2, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/idUSL3E7G205620110502; see also 
Takahashi, Financial Support, supra note 154, at 42; Toyohiro Nomura, Taro Hokugo & Chihiro 
Takenaka, Japan’s Nuclear Liability System, in JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR 
DAMAGE 15, 18 (OECD 2012). 
 157. DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMM. FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMP., Secondary Guidelines on 
Determination of the Scope of Nuclear Damage Resulting from the Accident at the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants, at pt. V (May 31, 2011), 
reprinted in JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 103, 103–20, (OECD 2012); 
DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMM. FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMP., Interim Guidelines on 
Determination of the Scope of Nuclear Damage Resulting from the Accident at the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants, at pt. 7 (May 31, 2011), 
reprinted in JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 123, 148–57 (OECD 2012). 
 158. See Takahashi, Financial Support , supra note 154, at 57, Figure 1.3 (OECD 2012). 
 159. IAEA ACTION PLAN, supra note 53, at 5. The encouragement to join a liability regime was 
reiterated in a conference resolution at the 56th General Conference in September 2012. IAEA, 
Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety, 
at 4, Gen. Conf. Res. 56, IAEA Doc. GC(56)/RES/9 (Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://www.iaea 
.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56Resolutions/English/gc56res-9_en.pdf. 
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Although courted to join the CSC (a step that would bring the CSC into 
force),
160
 Japan is not currently a member of any of the international 
nuclear liability conventions, but rather, it has its own legislation 
addressing nuclear liability matters.
161
 Since the accident, Japan has been 
implementing its compensation scheme under its national framework.
162
 
D. Recommendations to Achieving a Global Nuclear Liability Regime 
The INLEX group was tasked with recommending actions to achieve 
the goals articulated in the IAEA Action Plan applicable to nuclear 
liability regimes. By the end of its May 2012 meeting, INLEX developed 
Recommendations on How to Facilitate Achievement of a Global Nuclear 
Liability Regime that were reported to the Director General of the IAEA 
and noted in his August 2012 report on progress on the IAEA’s post 
Fukushima Action Plan.
163
 The main points are summarized as follows: 
1. States with nuclear installations should adhere to, and adopt in 
national legislation, “one or more of the relevant international 
nuclear liability instruments that contain commonly shared 
 
 
 160. Faure, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the U.S. and 
International Liability Schemes, supra note 141, at 231 n.50. 
 161. See Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Compensation for Nuclear Damage], 
Law No. 147 of 1961, as amended by Law No. 19 of 2009, § 16 (Japan); Genshiryoku Songai Baishō 
Hoshō Keiyaku ni kansuru Hōritsu [Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage], 
Law No. 148 of 1961, as amended by Law No. 19 of 2009, § 2, reprinted in 84 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 
159, 171 (2009).  
 162. See, e.g., JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (OECD 2012) 
(providing a compilation of Japanese statutes, and guidelines related to liability and compensation with 
commentary by Japanese legal experts); see also Michael Faure & Jing Liu, The Tsunami of March 
2011 and the Subsequent Nuclear Incident at Fukushima: Who Compensates the Victims, 37 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 191–205 (2012), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/ 
wmelpr/vol37/iss1/5; Eri Osaka, Corporate Liability, Government Liability, And The Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 427, 439–44 (2012), available at http://www.law 
.washington.edu/PacRim/. 
 163. IAEA, Progress on the Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, 
Supplementary Information, at 24, ¶ 144, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/2012/11-GC(56)/INF/5 (Aug. 15, 
2012) [hereinafter IAEA, Progress on the Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan], available at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-5-att1_en.pdf 
(providing a link to the INLEX recommendations, http://ola.iaea.org/ola/documents/ActionPlan.pdf). 
A brief background paper prepared by the IAEA secretariat precedes the recommendations. Int’l 
Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX), Recommendations on How to Facilitate Achievement of a 
Global Nuclear Liability Regime, As Requested by the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter INLEX, Recommendations], http://ola.iaea.org/ola/documents/ 
ActionPlan.pdf. 
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international principles reflecting the enhancements developed 
under the auspices of the IAEA during the 1990’s.”164 
2. “States with nuclear installations should strive to establish treaty 
relations with as many States as practical with a view to ultimately 
achieving universal participation in a global nuclear liability regime 
that establishes treaty relations among all States.”165  
3. States with no nuclear installations should consider “adhering to a 
global regime, taking into account the benefits that such a regime 
offers for victims once it achieves adherence by a significant 
number of States with nuclear installations.”166  
4. “States with nuclear installations should ensure that there are 
adequate funds available to compensate all victims of a nuclear 
incident, without discrimination.”167 States can do this by: 
a. Establish[ing] compensation and financial security amounts 
significantly higher than the minimum amounts envisaged under 
the existing instruments; 
b. Undertak[ing] regular reviews the adequacy of compensation 
amounts in order to ensure that their value is maintained and that 
they reflect developments in the understanding of the possible 
impact of incidents . . . noting that there is a trend towards 
establishing unlimited liability of the operator; 
c. Undertak[ing] regular reviews of the adequacy of financial 
security amounts in order to ensure that those amounts reflect 
available capacity in insurance markets, as well as other sources 
of financial security; 
d. Be[ing] prepared to set up appropriate funding mechanisms in 
cases where the amount of damage to be compensated exceeds 
the available compensation and financial security amounts; 
e. Provid[ing] compensation for latent injuries, noting that the 
revised Vienna and Paris Conventions set a 30‐year time limit 
for filing claims for personal injury; and 
 
 
 164. INLEX, Recommendations, supra note 163, at 3, Rec. 1. 
 165. Id. at 3, Rec. 2. 
 166. Id. at 3, Rec. 3. 
 167. Id. at 3, Rec. 4. 
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f. Ensur[ing] that compensation is available in the case of an 
incident directly due to grave . . . [and exceptional] natural 
disasters . . . .
168
 
5. States should “ensure that all claims arising from a nuclear 
accident are dealt with in a single forum in a prompt, equitable and 
non‐discriminatory manner with minimal litigation . . . .”169 
The recommendations are nominally “convention-neutral.” INLEX noted 
that:  
[T]he CSC establishes treaty relations among States that belong to 
the Paris Convention, the Vienna Convention or neither, while 
leaving intact the Joint Protocol that establishes treaty relations 
among States that belong to the Paris Convention or the Vienna 
Convention. In addition to providing treaty relations, the CSC 
mandates the adoption of the enhancements developed under the 
auspices of the IAEA and contains features to promote appropriate 
compensation, including an international fund to supplement the 
amount of compensation available for nuclear damage.
170
 
So what’s next? The INLEX recommendations reflect, of necessity, high-
level goals and aspirations. After all, the INLEX experts themselves come 
from different backgrounds and viewpoints on the efficacy of the various 
existing international instruments. There is no certain consensus on how 
best to effect these recommendations, nor is there a simple or obvious fix 
that will convert the current “patchwork” of liability regimes into a 
seamless whole.
171
 There are strong and often passionate views on the 
merits and adequacy of either the Paris and Vienna Conventions and the 
Joint Protocol linking them, or the CSC, as the foundation for achieving 
the goal of an international regime.
172
 Indeed, some doubt whether there is 
 
 
 168. Id. at 3–4, Rec. 4(a)-(f). Article I.J. of the 2004 Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra 
note 138, and Article 6.1 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 133, modified the text of the respective 
original conventions to eliminate the exemption from liability if an accident was caused by a grave 
natural disaster. 
 169. INLEX, Recommendations, supra note 162, Rec. 5. 
 170. Id. at 3, Rec. 2. 
 171. See Pelzer, Main Features, supra note 141, at 383; Jakub Handrlica, Reactions to the EC 
Legal Study from a Legal and Policy Viewpoint, in PROSPECTS OF A CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY 
REGIME IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 39, 41–42 (2012) [hereinafter PROSPECTS OF A 
CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME]. 
 172.  Compare Norbert Pelzer, Learning the Hard Way: Did the Lessons Taught by the Chernobyl 
Nuclear Accident Contribute to Improving Nuclear Law?, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE 
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really any merit to striving for a global liability regime if regional 
accommodations—such as a European or North American or an East 
Asian regime—can adequately address the interests of victims and 
operators.
173
 There are also strong views about the consistency of national 
legislation in non-members to the conventions, like India with the unifying 
principles of the international regime.
174
 In addressing these issues we still 
need to face other important questions. How far will private insurance 
cover heads of damage?
175
 Is the notion of unlimited operator liability a 
mere illusion? Do these regimes inappropriately shift the burden to the 
public in the form of “state aid” to operators?176 These questions remind us 
that the path to a global liability regime is not an easy one, and it may well 
be that modest progress toward adaptation of the universal principles in 
national legislation and further progress toward bringing the modernized 
regimes into force will have a salutary effect.
177
 
 
 
POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD 73, 111–15 (OECD 2006), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/ 
chernobyl/ (providing views doubting the efficacy of the CSC as the basis of a unifying regime); Vlad 
Chirpius, Could the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Become the 
Fundament for a Unified EU Legal Regime of the Nuclear Third Party Liability?, in PROSPECTS OF A 
CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME, supra note 171, at 71, 78–81 (same), with Wolfram Tonhauser, 
Reaction to the EC Legal Study from a Legal and Policy Viewpoint, in PROSPECTS OF A CIVIL 
NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME, supra note 171, at 24–25 (providing views supporting CSC as the basis 
of a global regime); Omer F. Brown, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage (CSC), in PROSPECTS OF A CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME, supra note 171, at 169–70 
(same); Ben McRae, The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Catalyst 
for a Global Nuclear Liability Regime, 79 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 17, 22–23 (2007) (same).  
 173. NORBERT PELZER, ON A GLOBAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIME 4 (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.burges-salmon.com/INLA_2012/10234.pdf; see also France, U.S. Differ on Universal 
Liability Regime, 52 NUCLEONICS WEEK 1–3 (July 27, 2011) (describing differences between France 
and the United States on approach to achieving global liability regime). 
 174. Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, No. 38 of 2010, 47 Gazette of India [Gaz. India], pt 
II, sec. 1, 1–15 (Sept. 21, 2010); Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011, 2112 Gaz. India, pt. 
II, sec. 3, 1–20 (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-civil-liability-for-
nuclear-damage-bill-2010-1042/. The controversy over the Indian regime largely centers on the 
provisions in Sections 4 and 17 of the 2010 Act and Rule 24 in the 2011 rules related to channeling of 
liability to the operator and the operator’s right of recourse against its suppliers. See, e.g., R. Gruendel 
& E. Kini, Through the Looking Glass, Placing India’s New Civil Liability Regime for Nuclear 
Damage in Context, 89 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 45, 48–53, 64-66 (2012); Jayshree Bajoria, India’s Nuclear 
Liability Dilemma, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-
and-security/indias-nuclear-liability-dilemma/p23305# (reporting interview with Ashley J. Tellis, 
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
 175. See Mark Tetley, Revised Paris and Vienaa Nuclear Liability Conventions—Challenges for 
Insurers, 77 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 27, 33–34, 36–38 (2006).  
 176. See Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis Of The Nuclear Liability 
Subsidy, 26 PACE ENV’L L. REV. 419, 445–47 (2009). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fukushima Daiichi accident has been a catalyst for a re-
examination of the underlying assumptions of the framework for nuclear 
safety and a cause for reflection on the capacity and integrity of the 
responsible institutions. Beyond the issues discussed in this Article related 
to strengthening regulators and operators and improving the liability 
system, there are other important areas being addressed at national levels 
and through international cooperation to enhance safety standards, 
strengthen protection against natural hazards, and improve emergency 
preparedness and response. Underlying all of these efforts is a need to 
foster a strong “cultural” commitment to nuclear safety at every level of 
the organizations involved in nuclear safety. As the contracting parties 
noted in their report on the August 2012 extraordinary meeting of the 
CNS, “Safety culture and human and organizational factors were identified 
as crosscutting issues, which affect the consideration of external events, 
design, severe accident management, including operator training, the good 
functioning of national organizations and emergency preparedness and 
response.”178 
As we have seen, much of the international response to the accident has 
proceeded largely within the existing framework for cooperation. In 
addressing the strength of regulatory bodies and plant operators, the peer 
review system remains the tool for consensus building and for providing 
incentives to organizational improvement. With responsibility for 
implementing regulation largely centered at the national level—and 
recognizing that the amendment of the CNS is no simple matter
179—
 
 
Allison Macfarlane, Fukushima Ministerial Conference, at 2 (Dec. 15, 2012), available at http://www 
.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/fukushima_2012/pdfs/statements_m67.pdf; Statement of Delphine Batho, 
Minister of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, Republic of France, at 10 (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/fukushima_2012/pdfs/statements_m74.pdf (French text). 
 178. 2nd Extraordinary Meeting Report, supra note 109, at 7, ¶ 24. “Safety culture” is “that 
assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an 
overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.” 
IAEA, Safety Culture, at 4, IAEA Doc. INSAG-4 (1991), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/ 
MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub882_web.pdf. The term “safety culture” in the nuclear safety context was 
introduced in the assessment of the Chernobyl accident. Id. at 3. For a further discussion of the concept 
of safety culture, see IAEA, Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture, IAEA Doc. INSAG-
15 (2002), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1137_scr.pdf; INPO, 
Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture (2004), http://www.efcog.org/wg/ism_pmi/docs/ 
Safety_Culture/Dec07/INPO%20PrinciplesForStrongNuclearSafetyCulture.pdf. The NRC has adopted 
a policy statement on safety culture. NRC Final Safety Culture Policy Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,773 
(June 14, 2011). 
 179. See IAEA, CNS, supra note 61, art. 32.  
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focusing on the robustness of the peer review system may well prove to be 
the best approach. It is, however, an approach that requires vigilance, 
frankness in assessments, and continued movement toward a more 
transparent sharing of national reports and assessments through the various 
review mechanisms. 
With respect to nuclear liability, the issue has been primarily one of 
continuing to move forward with ratification of the improvements to the 
liability regimes by parties to the existing conventions or by drawing 
unaffiliated countries into a liability convention. As one commentator put 
it, there has been both “progress and standstill” in the liability field.180 
Even if a well-integrated global regime is not within our grasp, continued 
efforts to harmonize the regimes and broaden the participation in them are 
worthy objectives. The Fukushima Daiichi accident was termed a 
“manmade disaster” by the National Diet Investigation Commission181 
because the accident was as much a consequence of the complacency and 
hubris of those responsible for safety as it was the result of the impact of 
extraordinary natural events. That is an observation that should be kept in 
the forefront as the international community continues to implement the 
IAEA Action Plan’s blueprint for addressing the lessons learned from the 
accident. Ultimately, States will need to show how outcomes of the studies 
and evaluations under the plan have been translated into meaningful 
measures to strengthen institutions, improve plant designs, mitigate the 
impact of malfunctions and natural events, and protect the public. 
 
 
 180. Pelzer, Main Features, supra note 141, 382–83. 
 181. NAT’L DIET REPORT, supra note 2, Exec. Summary, at 16. 
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